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INTRODUCTION 
The Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989 ("CYPF Act") has 
introduced a radical change in the youth justice system in New Zealand. The object 
of the Act is to promote the well-being of children, young persons and their families. 
Where young offenders are concerned, this is to be achieved by ensuring they are 
dealt with in a way that both acknowledges their needs and makes them accept 
responsibility for their offending. The philosophy underlying the youth justice system 
under the CYPF Act has shifted away from the welfare oriented approach of earlier 
legislation, to a justice model emphasising notions of due process and accountability. 
In line with the new philosophy of accountability the legislation sets out certain 
rights of young persons in the justice system and provides for young persons to take 
part in the process when decisions that are being made about their offending. 
Central to the Act is the novel approach of empowering families to themselves deal 
with their children who offend. Under the Act families, whanau, hapu, iwi and 
family groups are encouraged to play a major role in deciding how offending by 
their children should be dealt with. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, many of the reactions to this new system of youth justice 
have been adverse. Criticism has emanated from diverse quarters, including police, 
politicians and judges. There have been press reports about the Act bearing 
headlines such as "Youth law in trouble from the start",1 and "Act makes it tough 
for police to nab young thugs".2 In an early decision under the Act, Sinclair J 
described the youth justice provisions as "an absolute minefield."3 Government 
backbencher, Jeff Whittaker, presented a paper to caucus on 12 November 1991 
1 The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 5 December 1992, 10. 
2 The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 18 February 1992, 7. 
3 R v Toko (1991) FRNZ 447, 447. 
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detailing the "frustration" being experienced in Hastings because the Act lacks 
penalties to effectively deal with vandalism.4 A number of members of the police 
have publicly condemned aspects of the Act. Police Association Secretary, Steve 
Hinds, has described the requirements under the Act to inform young persons of 
their rights as "too tough";5 Police Association Secretary, Graham Harding has 
described provisions of the Act as "unworkable" and "absurd";6 and Police 
Commissioner, John Jamieson has stated that the Act has "seriously inhibited" 
policing and the public good.7 
It is now nearly three years since the Act came into force on 1 November 1989 and 
the controversy continues. In the New Zeal.and Herald of 20 June 1992 the retiring 
Police Chief Superintendent of Manukau District Police, Jim Morgan, was quoted 
as saying that the benefits from the CYPF Act had been "immense"8; then, less 
than 6 weeks later, the Commissioner of Police, John Jamieson, described the 
provisions as a "serious restriction" on police which was causing them a level of 
frustration "unmatched in [his] 36 years of policing."9 
In the midst of the debate about the CYPF Act, an aspect which has received little 
attention is the international standards which exist in the area of youth justice. In 
this paper I analyse the objects and principles of the youth justice provisions of the 
CYPF Act, and look at some specific provisions of the Act, from an international 
childrens' rights perspective. 
There are a number of international instruments setting out the rights of young 
persons, and providing guidelines for legislation in the area of youth justice. In 
Part I of this paper, I look at the international instruments relevant to the rights of 
4 Above nl, 5. 
5 The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 4 December 1991, 3. 
6 The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 4 December 1991, 1. 
7 (1992) NZU 86. 
8 New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 20 June 1992, Section 1, 9. 
9 Text of a speech to Auckland post graduate students, 13 August 1992, p 1. 
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young persons in the criminal process. In Part II, I briefly outline sources of rights 
for young persons in the criminal process existing in New Zealand apart from the 
CYPF Act. From this it will appear that without the CYPF Act, the level of 
protection available to young persons in the criminal process would be below that 
required under international instruments. In Part III of this paper, I analyse the 
objects and principles of the youth justice provisions in the CYPF Act in light of 
international guidelines. Finally, in Part IV, I look at some specific provisions in the 
youth justice section of the CYPF Act and analyse criticisms that have been made 
of those provisions in light of international standards. The scope does not exist in 
this paper to analyse all the youth justice provisions of the CYPF Act in the light of 
the international instruments. Accordingly I concentrate only on the provisions 
relating to diversion, arrest, young persons' rights when being interviewed by police 
and the admissibility of statements. 
I will conclude that the youth justice provisions of the CYPF Act represent a major 
improvement on the previous legislation in New Zealand, and go a considerable way 
towards meeting international obligations in the youth justice field. Nevertheless, 
I will note that there are still a number of areas in which New Zealand laws and 
practices fall short of meeting the standards required internationally. I will argue 
that New Zealand domestic law and practices must not be viewed in isolation, but 
should be constantly compared with the standards expected in the international 
community. Accordingly the provisions of the CYPF Act must be interpreted by the 
courts and by those operating under them, bearing the international instruments in 
mind. In addition, strenuous efforts should be made to improve compliance with 
international instruments in all areas where New Zealand currently fails to meet 
international standards. 
I INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 
From as early as 1924 when the League of Nations adopted the Geneva Declaration 
of the Rights of the Child,10 there has been international recognition that the 
10 League of Nations Official Joumai Special Supplement No 21 October 1924, 43. 
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vulnerability of children and young persons entitles them to special protection. This 
entitlement is recognised in Article 25(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,11 which proclaims that "[m]otherhood and childhood are entitled to special 
care and assistance." It is also recognised in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR ") and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") (together the "1966 Human Rights 
Covenants").12 Article 10(3) of the ICESCR provides: 
Special measures of protection and assistance should be taken on behalf of all children and 
young persons without any discrimination for reasons of parentage or other conditions. 
Article 24 of the ICCPR provides: 
Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as are 
required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State. 
Because children are entitled to extra protection, in addition to instruments which 
confer rights on all persons, there are a number of international instruments 
specifically applicable to children and young persons. These instruments elaborate 
on the special protection States are required to provide to children and young 
persons. 
I outline the international instruments relevant to youth justice below, and give an 
overview of the standards New Zealand law and practices must meet to conform 
with international requirements. With the exception of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, I have divided the instruments into two broad categories: those 
which impose binding obligations on States Parties and those which set minimum 
standards expected of Member States. 
11 General Assembly resolution 217A(III), 10 December 1948. 
12 General Assembly resolution 2200A(XXI), 16 December 1966. 
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1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights13 
While the question of whether the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is strictly 
legally binding is the subject of academic debate, its importance as the "accepted 
general articulation of recognised rights"14 cannot be underestimated. 
The rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration are clearly applicable to children 
and young persons. The preamble refers to the "inalienable rights of all members 
of the human family" (my emphasis), and Article 2 proclaims that "Everyone is 
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind ... " (my emphasis). 
The Universal Declaration proclaims such basic human rights as the right to "life, 
liberty and security of person",15 the right not to be "subjected to arbitrary arrest, 
detention or exile",16 and the right of any person charged with a penal offence to 
be "presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law and in a public trial at 
which he has all the guarantees necessary for his defence."17 
The Universal Declaration also emphasises the importance of the family by 
proclaiming in Article 16(3) that the family" ... is the natural and fundamental group 
unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State." Further, 
Article 12 proclaims that no one shall be subjected to ... arbitrary interference with 
his privacy, family, home or correspondence." 
13 Above nll. 
14 American Law Institute Restatement of the Law the 171ird - The Foreign Relations Law 
of the United States (American Law Institute, St Paul, 1987) 156. 
15 Above nll, Article 3. 
16 Above nll, Article 9. 
17 Above nll, Article 11. 
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2. Binding Instruments 
(a) The 1966 Human Rights Covenants - The 1966 Human Rights Covenants 
elaborate the rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
New Zealand has ratified each Covenant and also the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This means New 
Zealand is legally bound at international law to give domestic effect to the 
rights set out in the Covenants. As with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, it is clear the Covenants confer rights on children and young persons 
as well as adults. The preamble of each Covenant again refers to the 
"inalienable rights of all members of the human family." 
The Covenants reiterate the obligation of Member States to protect the family 
recognised in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 10(1) of the 
ICESCR provides that "[t]he widest possible protection and assistance should 
be accorded to the family, ... particularly ... while it is responsible for the care 
and education of dependent children," and Article 23 of the ICCPR provides 
that "[t]he family is the fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to 
protection by society and the State." 
Amongst other things, Article 9 provides that "Everyone has the right to 
liberty and security of person. No one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or 
detention," and that "[a]nyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time 
of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any 
charges against him." Article 14 reiterates the right proclaimed in the 
Universal Declaration of a person charged with a criminal offence to be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty, and sets out minimum guarantees due 
to a person in the determination of any criminal charge against him or her. 
These include the rights "to be informed promptly and in detail of the nature 
and cause of the charge against him"; "to have adequate time and facilities to 
prepare his defence"; "to communicate with counsel of his own choosing"; "to 
be tried in his presence and to defend himself in person or through legal 
assistance of his own choosing" and the right to be informed of the right to 
legal assistance. 
1111 
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In addition to these basic guarantees to which all persons are entitled in the 
determination of any criminal charge against them, Article 14(4) provides that 
"[i]n the case of juvenile persons, the procedure shall be such as will take 
account of their age and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation." 
(b) Convention on the Rights of the Child - the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly in 1989.
18 It details 
the special care to which children and young persons are entitled bearing in 
mind the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 Human Rights 
Covenants. The Convention is the first instrument which gives childrens' rights 
the force of international law for States that ratify it. 
The New Zealand Government were one of the sponsors of the Convention 
and signed it on 1 October 1990. The Convention has received considerable 
support world wide. This is illustrated both by the record response on the first 
day the Convention was opened for signature, when 61 countries signed; and 
by the fact that the Convention entered into force just over 7 months later -
which is a remarkably short length of time for an international treaty to come 
into effect.19 As at 1 May 1992 the Convention had been ratified by 117 
States, making it one of the most highly ratified Conventions. 
While New Zealand has not yet ratified the Convention, it has signed it, 
signifying an intention to ratify.20 Accordingly, and given the status of this 
Convention by virtue of its record level of acceptance world wide, it is essential 
18 General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989, annex. 
19 The Convention came into force on 2 September 1990 - 30 days after the 20th 
ratification. 
20 Prior to signing the Convention a review of New Zealand legislation was undertaken 
by the Ministry of External Relations and Trade to identify impediments to eventual 
ratification of the Convention. Since signing the Convention, the Ministry has 
coordinated a further review of New Zealand legislation and is currently preparing a 
report for Cabinet outlining areas where New Zealand legislation conflicts with 
provisions of the Convention. It is the general practice in New Zealand for any 
necessary legislative amendments to be made prior to ratifying international 
Conventions. The Ministry expect a cabinet decision on ratification of the Convention 
before the end of this year. 
-• • 
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that New Zealand legislation in the area of youth justice meets the standards 
set out in the Convention. 
Two of the more important provisions of the Convention for the purposes of 
this paper are set out below: 
Article 37 provides: 
States Parties shall ensure that: 
(b) No child shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily. The 
arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with the law and shall 
be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time; 
( c) Every child deprived of liberty shall be treated with humanity and respect of the 
inherent dignity of the human person, and in a manner which takes into account the 
needs of persons of his or her age. In particular, every child deprived of liberty shall 
be separated from adults unless it is considered in the child's best interest not to do so 
and shall have the right to maintain contact with his or her family through 
correspondence and visits, save in exceptional circumstances; 
( d) Every child deprived of his or her liberty shall have the right to prompt access to 
legal and other appropriate assistance, as well as the right to challenge the legality of 
the deprivation of his or her liberty before a court or other competent, independent and 
impartial authority, and to a prompt decision on any such action. 
Article 40 provides: 
(1) States Parties recognize the right of every child alleged as, accused of, or 
recognized as having infringed the penal law to be treated in a manner consistent with 
the promotion of the child's sense of dignity and worth, which reinforces the child's 
respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of others and which takes into 
account the chid's age and lhe desirability of promoting the child's reintegration and the 
child's assuming a constructive role in society. 
(2) To this end, and having regard lo the relevant provisions of international 
instruments, Slales Parties shall, in particular, ensure that: ... 
(b) Every child alleged as or accused of having infringed the penal law has at 
least the following guarantees: 
(i) To be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law; 
(ii) To be informed promptly and directly of the charges against him or her, 
and, if appropriate, through his or her parents or legal guardians, and to 
have legal or other appropriate assistance in the preparation and 
presentation of his or her defence; 
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(iii) To have the matter determined without delay by a competent, independent 
and impartial authority or judicial body in a fair hearing according to law, 
in the presence of legal or other appropriate assistance and, unless it is 
considered not to be in the best interest of the child, in particular, taking 
into account his or her age or situation, his or her parents or legal 
guardians; 
(iv) Not to be compelled to give testimony or to confess guilt; ... 
(3) States Parties shall seek to promote the establishment of laws, procedures, 
authorities and institutions specifically applicable to children alleged as, accused of, or 
recognized as having infringed the penal law, and, in particular: 
(a) The establishment of a minimum age below which children shall be 
presumed not to have the capacity to infringe the penal law; 
(b) Whenever appropriate and desirable, measures for dealing with such 
children without resorting to judicial proceedings, providing that human rights and legal 
safeguards are fully respected. 
( 4) A variety of dispositions, such as care, guidance and superv1s1on orders; 
counselling; probation, foster care; education and vocational training programmes and 
other alternatives to institutional care shall be available to ensure that children are dealt 
with in a manner appropriate to their well-being and proportionate both to their 
circumstances and the offence. 
3. Standard Setting Instruments 
In addition to the binding instruments outlined above, there are a number of United 
Nations instruments which are not directly binding on Member States, but provide 
guidelines as to the minimum standards domestic criminal justice laws and practices 
are expected to meet. The main standard setting documents which will be referred 
to in this paper are outlined below. 
(a) The Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under any Form of 
Detention or Jmprisonment21 - This instrument sets out principles to apply for 
the protection of all persons deprived of their liberty, whether as a result of 
conviction for an offence or for any other reason. In particular, Principle 16 
provides that: 
Promptly after arrest ... a detained or imprisoned person shall be entitled to notify, or 
to require the competent authority to notify, members of his family or other appropriate 
21 General Assembly resolution 43/173 of 9 December 1988, annex. 
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persons of his choice of hjs arrest, detention or imprisonment ... and of the place where 
he is kept in custody .... 
If a detained or imprisoned person is a juvenile ... the competent authority shall on its 
own initiative undertake the notification referred to in the present principle. Special 
attention shall be given to notifying parents or guardians. 
(b) the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile 
Justice ("the Beijing Rules" )22 - The Beijing Rules were adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly in 1985, and Member States were invited 
to adapt their national legislation to conform with the Rules. The resolution 
adopting the Beijing Rules recalls the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the 1966 Human Rights Covenants, and recognises that "the young, owing 
to their early stage of human development, require particular care and 
assistance with regard to physical, mental and social development, and require 
legal protection in conditions of peace, freedom, dignity and security.23 The 
Beijing Rules are designed to serve as a model for member states of standards 
to be applied in the area of juvenile justice and are "intended to be attainable 
as a policy minimum. "24 
Part 1 of the Beijing Rules sets out general principles. In particular, Rule 2.3 
provides: 
"Efforts shall be made to establish in each national jurisdiction, a set of laws, rules and 
provisions specifically applicable to juvenile offenders and institutions and bodies 
entrusted with the functions of the administration of juvenile justice and designed: 
(a) To meet the varying needs of juvenile offenders, while protecting their basic 
rights; ... • 
Rule 7.1 affirms the "most basic procedural safeguards"25 to be applied to 
juveniles in the criminal process. It states: 
22 General Assembly Resolution 40/33 of 29 November 1985, Annex. 
23 Above n22, 1. 
u Above n22, 1. 
25 Official Commentary to Rule 7.1 of the Beijing Rules, above n22, 2. 
Ill 
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Basic procedural safeguards such as the presumption of innocence, the right to be 
notified of the charges, the right to remain silent, the right to counsel, the right to the 
presence of a parent or guardian, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses and 
the right to appeal to a higher authority shall be guaranteed at all stages of proceedings. 
Part 2 of the Beijing Rules deals with investigation and prosecution of young 
persons. In particular, Rule 10 provides: 
10.1 Upon the apprehension of a juvenile, her or his parents or guardian shall be 
immediately notified of such apprehension, and, where such immediate 
notification is not possible, the parents or guardian shall be notified within the 
shortest possible time thereafter. 
10.2 A judge or other competent official or body shall, without delay, consider the 
issue of release. 
10.3 Contacts between the law enforcement agencies and a juvenile offender shall be 
managed in such a way as to respect the legal status of the juvenile, promote the 
well-being of the juvenile and avoid harm to her or him, with due regard to the 
circumstances of the case. 
Rule 11 promotes the use of diversion from the justice system for young 
persons. Rule 11.1 provides: 
Consideration shall be given, wherever appropriate, to dealing with juvenile offenders 
without resorting to formal trial by the competent authority ... 
Part 3 of the Beijing Rules sets out rules for adjudication and disposition of 
cases involving young persons. In particular, Rule 14.2 provides: 
The proceedings shall be conducive to the best interests of the juvenile and shall be 
conducted in an atmosphere of understanding, which shall allow the juvenile to 
participate therein and to express herself or himself freely. 
Rule 15 also provides for and accused young person to be represented by a 
legal adviser, and for the parents or guardians of the young person to 
participate in the proceedings unless their exclusion is in the young person's 
interests . 
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(c) the United Natio11S Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their 
Liberty26 ("the JDL Rules") - The JDL Rules were adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly in December 1990 recognising " ... that because of 
their high vulnerability, juveniles deprived of their liberty require special 
attention and protection and that their rights and well-being should be 
guaranteed during and after the period when they are deprived of their 
liberty."27 The JDL Rules were adopted bearing in mind the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 Human Rights Covenants, as well 
as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Standard Minimum 
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.28 Member States were invited to adapt 
national legislation, policies and practices to the spirit of the JDL Rules and 
to report regularly to the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control on the 
results achieved in implementing the JDL Rules.29 
Amongst other things, the JDL Rules emphasize that deprivation of the liberty 
of juveniles should be a disposition of last resort used only in exceptional 
cases, and for the minimum period necessary.30 
( d) the United Natio11S Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency31 ("the 
Riyadh Guidelines") - The Riyadh Guidelines were adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly in December 1990 in recognition of the need to 
develop "national, regional and international approaches and strategies for the 
prevention of juvenile delinquency."32 Again, the resolution adopting the 
Riyadh Guidelines cites the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1966 
26 General Assembly resolution 45/113, 14 December 1990, annex. 
27 Above n26, 2. 
28 Economic and Social Council resolution 663(XXIV), 1. 
'19 Above n26, 2. 
30 Above n26, Rules 1 and 2. 
31 General Assembly resolution 45/112, 14 December 1990, annex. 
32 Above n31, 1. 
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Human Rights Covenants, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.33 
Guidelines 11 to 19 emphasise the importance of State initiatives to strengthen 
and support the family, which is the "central unit responsible for the primary 
socialisation of children."34 Guideline 52 provides that "Governments should 
enact and enforce specific laws and procedures to promote and protect the 
rights and well-being of all young persons."35 Guideline 58 provides that 
programmes providing for the diversion of young offenders from the criminal 
justice system are to be used to the "maximum extent possible." 
All of the above standard setting instruments have been drafted bearing the 
Universal Declaration and the 1966 Human Rights Covenants in mind. They detail 
what is expected of Member States in order to fulfil their obligations under those 
instruments. It should be noted that the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
has called upon Member States to indicate whether they are applying the Beijing 
Rules in their periodic reports to the Committee under the ICCPR.36 Compliance 
with international standard setting documents can be seen as part of New Zealand's 
binding obligations under the 1966 Human Rights Covenants, and accordingly it is 
imperative that our domestic legislation and practices in the area of juvenile justice 
are not viewed in isolation, but are constantly compared with standards laid down 
by the international instruments. 
II THE POSITION APART FROM THE CYPF ACT 
Prior to the CYPF Act 1989 there was little statutory protection for young people 
embroiled in the criminal process in New Zealand. What did exist were the Judges' 
Rules of 1912 and 1930 (applicable to all people subject to police interviews) and 
certain common law rules which evolved to specifically protect young people. There 
33 Above n31, 1. 
34 Above n31, Guideline 12. 
35 Above n31, Guideline 52. 
36 General Comment No 21 ( 44) adopted on 6 April 1992. 
Ref CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.3, p 6. 
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were also internal police guidelines for dealing with young people contained in the 
police General Instructions. Since the CYPF Act was enacted in 1989, the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 ("Bill of Rights") has been enacted, creating a 
further important source of rights for people involved in the criminal process. I 
briefly outline below the relevant rights that derive from each of these sources. 
1. The Judges' Rules 
The Judges' Rules, formulated by the Queens Bench Division, provide guidelines for 
the police when they are conducting inquiries as to what behaviour is considered 
"fair" by the Courts.37 
The Judges' Rules provide that once a police officer who is questioning a person has 
decided to charge that person with a crime, the person must be cautioned that he 
or she is not obliged to say anything, but anything he or she does say will be taken 
down in writing and may be used in evidence. This caution must also be given when 
the person is taken into custody, and before a voluntary statement is taken from him 
or her.38 A statement made before there was time to caution a person will be 
admissible, however.39 
These rules apply to evidence obtained from children and young persons, as well as 
from adults. 
The Judges' Rules do not have the force of law, however a Judge has discretion to 
refuse to admit evidence obtained in contravention of them. 
37 R A Caldwell Garrow and Caldwell's Criminal Law in New Zealand (6 ed, 
Butterworths, Wellington, 1981) 494. 
38 Judges' Rules 1912, Rules 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
39 Above 1138, Rule 6. 
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2. Police General Instructions 
Certain of the police General Instructions are designed to provide guidance for 
police officers when dealing with young people. They are not enforceable in a court 
of law and therefore afford little protection to a young person if they are not 
complied with.40 The police officer involved may be subject to disciplinary 
measures, however any statement obtained from the young person will not 
necessarily be excluded as evidence in proceedings against that young person. 
I summarise below the guidelines prescribed in the General Instructions: 
(a) In an interview with anyone under 17, extreme care must be exercised to 
ensure no untrue admission of guilt or incorrect information is obtained on 
account of youth or lack of maturity. Any admission should be corroborated 
before acceptance.41 
(b) In an interview with a child under 14, a parent, guardian or teacher must be 
present unless there is a good reason to the contrary; and children under 14 
should only be taken to a police station in "unavoidable circumstances".42 
14-17 year olds should be interviewed in the presence of a parent, guardian or 
teacher where practicable, having regard to the particular circumstances.43 
(c) When anyone under 17 is interviewed without a parent or guardian present, 
the parent or guardian must be informed promptly.44 
40 However, Courts will look at breaches of the General Instructions as part of the 
background when deciding whether or not an interview was conducted "fairly". See 
page 16 below. 
41 Police General Instruction C42(1). 
42 Above n41, C42(2). 
43 Above n41, C42( 4). 
44 Above n41, C42(5). 
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( d) The utmost restraint and discretion should be exercised in using the power to 
arrest young persons without a warrant. Such arrests must only be made where 
there is good and sufficient reason.45 
3. Pre-1989 New Zealand Case Law 
The lack of clear statutory provisions for safeguarding the rights of young persons 
in criminal investigations prior to 1989 led to a body of case law developing to 
supplement the Judges' Rules where young persons are concerned. In R v C,46 
Chilwell J accepted as "a statement of general principle" that there was: 
.. . special need for care to ensure that young persons, because of their immaturity and other 
well-known characteristics, do not make untrue admissions of guilt, do not give incorrect 
information, and are protected against self-incrimination. 
The Court of Appeal in R v Tuhua47 stated: 
It is obvious enough that particular care and sensitivity are necessary on the part of police 
interviewers if they are fairly to question immature young people. 
Some particular principles that emerged from New Zealand case law prior to the 
CYPF Act, are: 
(a) While a breach of the Police General Instructions will not mean a statement 
is inadmissible, those instructions must not be "honoured in the breach".48 
They set out guidelines as to fairness and should be treated by the Courts in 
a similar way to the Judges' Rules.49 
45 Above n41, A106(2). 
46 Unreported, 28 February 1984, High Court Auckland Registry Tl00/73, Chilwell J. 
47 Unreported, 22 November 1988, Court of Appeal CA 2072/88. 
48 See: R v I (1987) 3 CRNZ 444, 445; H v Police (1989) 4 CRNZ 621, 623. 
49 R v WUnreported, 20 March 1987, Court of Appeal CA 33/87, 12. 
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(b) Police should be active in telling young people of their rights, not neutral.so 
(c) A caution must be broken down into simple language so that a young person 
can fully appreciate his or her rights.s1 
( d) Where a young person is to be interviewed, police should make "strenuous 
efforts" to contact a parent or guardian.s2 The fact that a young person does 
not ask for a parent to be notified, or for a phone call, may not be relied on 
as a sufficient reason for interviewing the young person without the presence 
of a parent or guardian.s3 The fact that the offence a young person is being 
questioned about is not serious is not a sufficient reason to interview a young 
person without contacting his or her parents or guardian.54 
( e) The level of maturity of a young person is a relevant factor in deciding whether 
or not a statement was fairly obtained - the court must "calculate how street 
wise [ the young person] is."ss 
The case law does not guarantee to young persons any special protection. Non-
compliance with the Judges' Rules or the police General Instructions does not mean 
that any evidence obtained must be excluded. Non-compliance is just a factor to be 
balanced when deciding whether evidence was fairly obtained. Against this other 
factors are to be balanced, such as the policy value of "conceding to police a proper 
degree of freedom in pursuing their investigations" (R v Tuhua)s6 and the degree 
to which the young person is "street wise" (R v H).s7 Accordingly, the pre-1989 
50 Above n49, 12. 
51 Above n49, 13. 
52 Above n48, 445. 
53 M v Police (1988) 3 CRNZ 506,511; R v W, above n49, 12. 
54 Above n52, 511. 
55 R v H (1986) 2 CRNZ 571, 573-574. 
56 Above n47. 
57 Above n55, 574. 
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case law not only fails to guarantee to young persons such basic procedural 
safeguards as the right to consult a lawyer and a parent or guardian, but in fact 
clearly contravenes international standards by allowing the degree to which a young 
person is "street wise" to be a factor taken into account when deciding whether 
evidence obtained in contravention of the Judges' Rules or police General 
Instructions should be admitted. The international instruments relevant to youth 
justice all clearly state that in the application of the rights conferred by those 
instruments to young persons there must be no discrimination for any reason.58 
4. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
The Bill of Rights confers certain rights on all persons in relation to aspects of the 
criminal process, including children and young people. In particular section 23( 1 )(b) 
provides that everyone who is arrested or detained under any enactment has the 
right to consult and instruct a lawyer without delay, and to be informed of that right, 
and section 23( 4) provides that everyone who is arrested or detained under any 
enactment for any offence or suspected offence has the right to refrain from making 
any statement and to be informed of that right. Section 23(5) provides that 
"[ e ]veryone deprived of liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for 
the inherent dignity of the person." 
Section 25(i) provides that a child charged with any offence has the right to have the 
determination of the charge " ... dealt with in a manner that takes account of the 
child's age." 
5. Summary of Protection for Young Persons existing apart from the CYPF Act 
It will be seen that apart from the CYPF Act, young persons facing criminal 
proceedings have little "special protection" as required by the international 
instruments. The Judges' Rules provide basic protection to which all persons are 
entitled and do not provide any extra protection for young persons and the case law 
58 See Article 10(3) of the ICESCR, Article 24 of the ICCPR, Article 2 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child; Rule 2.1 of the Beijing Rules and Rule 4 of 
the JDL Rules 
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falls short of guaranteeing extra protection to young persons. The Bill of Rights 
provides certain basic procedural rights to all persons in the criminal process, such 
as the right to consult a lawyer, and clearly significantly improves the protection 
available to young persons from that provided under the pre-1989 case law. 
However, only section 25(i) could be seen as providing any degree of "special 
protection" to young persons, by providing that children have the right to have 
charges against them determined in a manner which takes account of their age. It 
is submitted that this provision is not, in itself, sufficient to meet our international 
obligations to give "special protection" to young persons. 
Article 3(2) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides: 
States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or 
her well-being ... and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative 
measures. 
Article 40(3) provides: 
States Parties shall seek to promote the establishment of laws, procedures, authorities and 
institutions specifically applicable to children alleged as, accused of, or recognised as having 
infringed the penal law ... 
Article 2.3 of the Beijing Rules provides: 
Efforts shall be made to establish, in each national jurisdiction, a set of laws rules and provisions 
specifically applicable to juvenile offenders ... designed: 
(a) to meet the varying needs of juvenile offenders, while protecting their basic rights ... 
These provisions clearly envisage legislation guaranteeing extra protection to young 
persons to take account of their vulnerability. Accordingly, the need for the 
protection afforded to young persons under the CYPF Act is clear: without it New 
Zealand does not meet the standards required by international instruments in the 
area of juvenile justice. 
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Having given an overview of the requirements of international instruments in the 
area of juvenile justice, and of the protection accorded to young persons from 
sources aside from the CYPF Act, I now go on to critically examine the extent to 
which the CYPF Act meets international standards. 
III PHILOSOPHY, OBJECTS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CYPF ACT 
1. Philosophy of the Act - A Change from a Welfare Model to a Justice Model of 
Youth Justice 
There are two basic models of youth justice legislation, predicated on different 
philosophies of youth offending. The models are the "welfare" model and the 
"justice" model. Since 1925, and prior to the CYPF Act, New Zealand legislation 
for dealing with young offenders was based on the welfare model. This means it was 
based on the premise that youthful offending is a symptom of social problems and 
can be "cured" by taking a welfare approach. The philosophy of the Child Welfare 
Act 1925 was described as follows: 
The system of dealing with children under the Criminal Code has given place to a system of 
equity whereby the child is not regarded as a criminal who should be punished, but as one who 
requires the protection and assistance of the Court.59 
The long title to the Children and Young Persons Act 1974 showed a similar 
philosophy underpinned that Act. It was said to be: 
An Act to make provision for preventive and social work services for children and young persons 
whose needs for care, protection and control are not being met by parental or family care and 
who are at risk of becoming deprived, neglected, disturbed or ill-treated or offenders against the 
law. 
Under the 1974 Act, a child's offending was seen as being a symptom of a lack of 
parental care or control meaning the child needed help. Children ( defined as those 
under 14 years old) could only be brought before a Court by way of an action 
59 Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives of New Zealand, 1920, E4, 
13. (Quoted in J A Seymour, Dealing with Young Offenders in New Zealand - The 
System in Evolution, (Legal Research Foundation, School of Law, Auckland, New 
Zealand, 1976) 38.) 
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against their parents that they were in need of care, protection or control. Young 
persons (those over 14 but under 17) could come before a Court in relation to an 
offence either by being prosecuted, or by way of a complaint that they were in need 
of care, protection or control. A police officer dealing with a youthful offender had 
the options ( aside from taking no action or issuing a warning) of arresting the young 
person, in which case a prosecution would almost invariably60 follow; or referring 
him or her to the Youth Aid section of the police. The latter procedure was based 
on a "welfare" philosophy in that under section 26, in most cases,61 before a Youth 
Aid officer could prosecute the young person a conference with a social worker had 
to be held.62 
The CYPF Act introduces a change from the welfare model of legislation to the 
justice model. This model is predicated on the idea that juvenile offending is simply 
a stage many young people go through,63 and that the appropriate way to deal with 
it is to hold the young person responsible for their offending. While a welfare 
model of youth justice legislation focuses mainly on the welfare of the offender, a 
justice model focuses on the offence. It emphasises accountability, and provides that 
welfare issues should be dealt with separately.64 
60 Occasionally the police Prosecutions Section or a supervising officer would overrule 
a decision to prosecute. 
61 There were exceptions to the requirement for a Youth Aid consultation where a young 
person was charged with murder, manslaughter, a non-imprisonable traffic offence or 
was already serving a sentence of supervision or periodic detention. 
62 While the philosophy of the 1974 Act was by and large a "welfare" philosophy, in 
practice the results under the Act were not always consistent with the ideology of a 
welfare model. See page 22 below. 
63 Considerable weight for this proposition is provided by a study carried out by the 
Research Section of the Department of Social Welfare and published in 1990, which 
recorded all court convictions of a cohort of New Zealand males born in 1957 who 
were still in New Zealand at age 10. The study found that at least one in every four 
males under the age of 25 in the study had appeared in a criminal court and been 
convicted before reaching the age of 25. It also found that over two thirds of them 
made only one or two appearances; and only a small percentage appeared on 
numerous occasions. See One in Four: Offending from age ten to twenty-four in a 
coho,t of New Zealand males, R Lovell and M Norris (Research Section, Department 
of Social Welfare, Head Office, Wellington, New Zealand, 1990). See also clause 5(e) 
of the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency. 
64 See section 208(b) of the CYPF Act. 
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Both models are open to criticism. A "pure" justice model would not require the 
welfare of a young offender to be taken into account at all when dealing with his or 
her offending. However, international standards clearly provide that the welfare of 
the young person must be treated as an important consideration when determining 
how to deal with a young offender.65 The CYPF Act cannot be criticised on this 
ground, because the welfare of young persons is not excluded from factors to be 
taken into account when dealing with their offending.66 
The welfare model, on the other hand, has been criticised as often leading to far 
greater intrusion into a young person's life than the offence which brought the young 
person to attention warrants.67 Therefore a young person's right to due process in 
the criminal system can be seen as being infringed.68 This was a problem that was 
identified under previous New Zealand youth justice legislation by the National 
Director of the Children, Young Persons and their Families Unit of the Department 
of Social Welfare: 
Previously, putting a young person in an institution because the particular offence defined 
someone as needing care, meant the sentence was often out of all keeping with the offence.
69 
Such a result can be seen as conflicting with Article 9(1) of the ICCPR, which 
prohibits "arbitrary detention" of persons; and Article 17 which states that "No one 
shall be subject to arbitrary ... interference with his privacy, family [or] home." Rule 
18.2 of the Beijing Rules is also relevant. In this respect, the move to a "justice" 
model of juvenile justice should lead to practices in the youth justice area 
conforming more closely to international standards than past practices under the 
"welfare" model. 
65 See the discussion on page 24 below. 
66 See page 23 below. 
67 See M Levine and H Wyn Orders of the Youth Court and the Worlc of the Youth Justice 
Coordinators (Evaluation Unit, Department of Social Welfare, Wellington, New 
Zealand, 1991) 53. See also the commentary to Rule 5, Beijing Rules, set out on page 
10 below. 
68 Note, in particular, Rule 17.l(a) of the Beijing Rules. 
69 The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 16 January 1992, 7. 
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2. Object of promoting the well-being of young persons 
While the CYPF Act represents a move to the justice model, it does not exclude the 
welfare of young persons from consideration . when dealing with young offenders. 
This can be seen from the object of the Act, and the general principles set out in 
section 5. 
The sole object of the CYPF Act is set out in section 4. It is to "promote the well-
being of children, young persons and their families and family groups." This 
statement of the object of the Act is followed by examples of the way in which the 
Act intends to achieve this aim. As far as the youth justice provisions of the Act are 
concerned, the well-being of young persons is to be achieved by: 
Ensuring that where children or young persons commit offences, -
(i) They are held accountable, and encouraged to accept responsibility, for their behaviour; 
and 
(ii) They are dealt with in a way that acknowledges their needs and that will give them the 
opportunity to develop in responsible, beneficial, and socially acceptable ways.70 
It is implicit from section 4 that the move to a justice model of dealing with young 
offenders is, at least in part, aimed at promoting the well-being of young persons. 
Specific provision for the welfare of young persons to be taken into account in the 
exercise of powers under the youth justice provisions of the Act is set out in 
section 5( c).71 This provides that: 
Consideration must always be given to how a decision affecting a young person will affect: 
(i) the welfare of that child or young person; ... 
70 Section 4(t). 
71 Section 5 sets out principles that apply to the entire Act. 
lAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA u; ~:·,r::- ~I f'i' OF V/ELL!f !C: - ~. 
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Although section 5(c) provides that the welfare of a young person must be taken 
into account when making decisions affecting that young person, it is implicit in the 
Act that (unlike the 1974 Act) this is not to be the paramount consideration as far 
as the youth justice provisions of the Act ar:e concerned.72 While international 
standards do require that the welfare of a young person must be considered, it need 
not be the paramount consideration. For instance, Article 3 of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child provides that: 
(1) In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare 
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities, or legislative bodies, the best interests of 
the child shall be a primary consideration. [My emphasis] 
Similarly, Rule 5.1 of the Beijing Rules provides: 
The juvenile justice system shall emphasize the well-being of the juvenile and shall ensure that 
any reaction to juvenile offenders shall always be in proportion to the circumstances of both the 
offenders and the offence. [My emphasis] 
It can be seen from the official commentary to Rule 5 of the Beijing Rules, that they 
are designed to apply to both the welfare and justice models of youth justice 
legislation, and are in fact designed to curb the most severe effects of each model. 
It reads: 
Rule 5 refers to two of the most important objectives of juvenile justice. The first objective is 
the promotion of the well-being of the juvenile. This is the main focus of those legal systems 
in which juvenile offenders are dealt with by family courts or administrative authorities, but the 
well-being of the juvenile should also be emphasized in legal systems that follow the criminal 
court model, thus contributing to the avoidance of merely punitive sanctions . 
72 Section 5 of the CYPF Act is expressed to be subject to section 6. Section 6 provides 
that where any conflict of principles or interests arises "the welfare and interests of 
the child or young person shall be the deciding factor.• However, section 6 applies 
only to Parts I, II, III, VI (other than sections 351-360), VII and VIII of the Act - ie, 
all sections other than the youth justice sections. The fact that section 6 is expressly 
excluded from these sections indicates that the 'paramountcy' rule is not to apply in 
the youth justice area. This is also shown in the Government's comments on a 
recommendation of the Ministerial Review Team that the paramountcy principle in 
the Act be strengthened. The Government's Response included a statement that 
"[e]nactment of the paramountcy principle on the lines suggested could blur the new 
approaches to youth justice, which concentrate on the accountability of young 
offenders for their behaviour.• The Government's Response to the Report of the 
Ministerial Review Team, 30 May 1992, p 1. 
I 
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The second objective is 'the principle of proportionality'. This principle is well-known as an 
instrument for curbing punitive sanctions, mostly expressed in terms of just desert in relation to 
the gravity of the offence. The response to young offenders should be based on the 
consideration not only of the gravity of the offence but also of personal circumstances. The 
individual circumstances of the offender ... should influence the proportionality of the reaction. 
[R]eactions aiming to ensure the welfare of the young offender may go beyond necessity and 
therefore infringe upon the fundamental rights of the young individual, as has been observed in 
some juvenile justice systems. Here, too, the proportionality of the reaction to the circumstances 
of both the offender and the offence, including the victim, should be safeguarded. 
3. Object of promoting the well-being of young persons' family groups 
Under the Children and Young Persons Act 1974, a young offender's family had 
little involvement in the process of deciding how he or she should be dealt with.73 
An innovation of the CYPF Act is the emphasis which is placed on the family group 
throughout. The general principles applicable to the whole Act in section 5 provide 
that a young person's family, whanau, hapu, iwi and family group should participate 
in making decisions affecting that young person,74 that the relationship between a 
young person and his or her family group should be maintained and strengthened,75 
and that consideration must always be given to how a decision affecting a young 
person will affect the stability of that young person's family group.76 
Section 208 sets out principles specifically applicable to the youth justice provisions 
of the CYPF Act. Included in section 208 is the principle that measures for dealing 
with young offenders should be designed to strengthen the family of the young 
person; and foster the ability of families to develop their own means of dealing with 
their young offenders. Thus two main propositions in relation to the family of an 
offender emerge: 
73 A Morris and W Young, Juvenile Justice in New Zealand: Policy and Practice (Institute 
of Criminology, Victoria University of Wellington, 1987) - pp 96 and 105. 
74 Section 5(a). 
75 Section 5(b ). 
76 Section 5( c)(ii). 
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(a) that the family should be involved in decision-making as to how to deal with a 
young offender; and 
(b) that an important aim of any measures taken must be to strengthen the family 
group. 
The aim of strengthening the family group is supported in international instruments. 
Article 16(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Article 23 of the 
ICCPR provide: 
The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by 
Society and the State. 
Article 10(1) of the ICESCR provides: 
The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the 
natural and fundamental group unit of society, particularly for its establishment and while it is 
responsible for the care and education of dependent children. 
The preamble to the Convention on the Rights of the Child states: 
... the family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the growth 
and well-being of all its members and particularly children, should be afforded the necessary 
protection and assistance so that it can fully assume its responsibilities within the community.77 
In addition, Article 11 of the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of 
Juvenile Delinquency provides that: "Every society should place a high priority on 
the wellbeing of the family and all its members" and Article 12 provides that: 
Since the family is the central unit responsible for the primary socialization of children, 
governmental and social efforts to preserve the integrity of the family, including the extended 
family, should be pursued .... 78 
77 Above n18, preambular paragraph 5. 
78 See also Rules 18.2 and 25.1 of the Beijing Rules; and Guidelines 13, 16 and 17 of the 
United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency. 
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The principle that the family of a young person should be involved in decision-
making about that young person is also supported by the international instruments. 
Rule 15.2 of the Beijing Rules, provides that the parents or guardians of a young 
person have the right to participate in all proceedings in relation to that young 
person, unless their exclusion is in the young person's interests. In addition, Article 
5 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, provides that: 
States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where applicable, 
the members of the extended family or community as provided for by local custom, legal 
guardians or other persons legally responsible for the child, to provide, in a manner consistent 
with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by 
the child of the rights recognized in the present Convention. 
4. The young person's voice 
While the emphasis on family participation in decision-making is a commendable 
innovation supported by international instruments, I submit that this emphasis has 
resulted in a lack of proper emphasis on the right of young persons to express their 
views when decisions are made concerning them. While section 5(a) of the CYPF 
Act sets out the principle that a young person's family, should "participate" in 
decision-making, and wherever possible "regard should be had" to their views; 
section 5( d) sets out the principle that, where a young person's views can be 
reasonably ascertained, they should be given "consideration". This contrast in 
wording can convey the impression that the views of the family are to be given 
greater weight than the views of the young person. 
The original Children and Young Persons Bill was subject to criticism for being of 
a monocultural nature; and, in particular, the paramountcy accorded to the interests 
of young persons was seen as conflicting with Maori traditional beliefs in which 
tribal views have precedence over the views of birth parents, and a young person's 
position is seen as involving duties rather than rights. 79 A great deal of effort was 
put into making the final version of the Bill more culturally sensitive, and this may 
79 Butterwort.hs Family Law Service Commentary, paragraph 6.603, p 6810. 
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explain this apparent subsuming of the young person's wishes to the views of the 
family under the CYPF Act. 
However, when international guidelines in this area are examined, it is submitted 
there is a strong argument that prominence should be given to the views of young 
persons. For example, in the context of adjudication of cases of juvenile offending, 
Rule 14.2 of the Beijing Rules provides: 
The proceedings shall be conducive to the best interests of the juvenile and shall be conducted 
in an atmosphere of understanding, which shall allow the juvenile to participate therein and to 
express herself or himself freely. 
Rule 15.2 provides that the parents or guardians of juveniles are entitled to 
participate in proceedings except where their exclusion is in the interests of the 
juvenile. It will be seen that under the Beijing Rules greater importance is placed 
on the participation of the young person than his or her parents, as the young person 
is always entitled to participate, but in some circumstances his or her parents are not 
so entitled. 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that children have a right to be 
heard in Article 12: 
States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views, the right 
to express those views freely in all mallers affecting the child, the views of the child being given 
due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. 
It is submitted that to meet international standards, it is imperative that the 
principle that a young person's views be given "consideration" is interpreted in a 
way that ensures the importance attached to a young person's views is no less than 
the importance attached to his or her family's views. 
It is also notable that section 5( d) of the Act states that when considering a young 
person's wishes, those wishes shall be given "such weight as is appropriate in the 
circumstances, having regard to the age, maturity, and culture of the child or young 
• 
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person" [my emphasis]. The inclusion of the word "culture" must mean that 
different weight may be accorded to young persons' wishes where they are of 
different cultures. Thus, a young person from a culture where the views of young 
persons are traditionally accorded little value, will have less regard taken of his or 
her wishes, than the wishes of a young person from a different culture where young 
persons have a greater say.80 Such a proposition is unacceptable by international 
standards. 
Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: 
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of 
the law. 
Article 26 of the ICCPR states: 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal 
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee 
to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status. 
Article 2 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child is also relevant in this regard. 
Article 2 provides that parties to the Convention: 
. .. shall respect and ensure the rights set forth ... irrespective of the child's or his or her parents' 
or legal guardians' race, colour, sex, language, national, ethnic or social origins, property, 
disability, birth or other status . 
The inclusion of a young person's culture as a guide to the weight that should be 
accorded to his or her views in the CYPF Act clearly conflicts with international law . 
80 See M Henaghan, "The 'Rights' of Children when Decisions are made about and 
which Affect the Welfare and Interests of Children", in The Family Court Ten Year.r 
On (Family Law Conference papers, New Zealand Law Society, Auckland, 1991) 48, 
54. 
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During a study of the youth justice system in New Zealand in 1987 (relating to the 
1974 Act), a number of young people were interviewed about their experiences in 
the Children and Young Persons Court. "It's a waste of time talking. They don't 
listen," was the response of one.81 This sentiment was echoed by other young 
people interviewed. While the principle in section 5( d) of the CYPF Act goes some 
way towards providing young people with the right to express their views, I submit 
it could go further. The move to a "justice" system of dealing with offending by 
young people involves treating young people as being responsible for their actions. 
A concomitant of this accountability must be a readiness of those in authority to 
listen to, and attach importance to, young peoples' views. The principles section of 
the CYPF Act undermines the voice of children and young persons; both by the 
implication that the family's views are more important, and by the provision that a 
young person's culture will affect the weight attached to his or her views. 
In a recent study of the youth justice provisions of the CYPF Act, the conclusion was 
reached that: 
There is no doubt that the perceived level of involvement of families and young people is far 
greater now than in the former system where many of them would have been part of the court 
process .... 
However, the fact remains that the majority of young persons felt that they had not been 
involved in the FGC or in the decision about the outcome.82 
This result does not conform with international instruments in the youth justice field. 
5. Principles guiding exercise of powers under the Youth Justice provisions 
Section 208 sets out principles specifically applicable to the youth justice provisions 
of the CYPF Act, and I summarise these below. 
81 Above, n73, 105. 
82 G M Maxwell and A Morris Family Participation, Cultural Diversity and Victim 
Involvement in Youth Justice: A New Zealand Experiment Institute of Criminology, 
Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, 1992. [NB: As at 1 September 1992 
publication of this paper is pending, and quotation from it has only been permitted on 
the basis that any findings will not appear in any publication without the prior consent 
of the authors.] 
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(a) Diversion 
Section 208(a) provides that, unless the public interest requires otherwise, 
criminal proceedings should not be instituted against a young person if there 
is an alternative means of dealing with the matter. 
The principle of diverting young offenders from the criminal justice system is 
in accordance with the international guidelines for dealing with young 
offenders, and is discussed in more detail on pages 34-37 below. 
(b) Penalties to be designed to strengthen family and take least restrictive form 
Section 208( d) provides that a young person who commits an offence should 
be kept in the community where practicable ( and consonant with the need to 
ensure public safety). Section 208(f) provides that any sanctions should take 
the form most likely to promote the development of the young person within 
his or her family and should take the least restrictive form appropriate. 
The support existing in the international instruments for measures designed to 
strengthen the family unit has already been shown on page ? above. The 
principle that penalties should take the least restrictive form appropriate also 
conforms with international guidelines relating to youth justice. For example, 
Rule 5(2) of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 
provides that "[ a ]s a rule, ... young persons should not be sentenced to 
imprisonment" and Rule 2.6 of the Standard Minimum Rules for Non-
custodial Measures provides that "[n]on-custodial measures should be used in 
accordance with the principle of minimum intervention." Rule 17.l(c) of the 
Beijing Rules provides that "Restrictions on the personal liberty of the juvenile 
shall be imposed only after careful consideration and shall be limited to the 
possible minimum." 
Ill 
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( c) Principle of vulnerability 
Section 208( e) provides that a young person's age is a mitigating factor in 
determining whether impose sanctions in respect of offending and the nature 
of any sanctions; and section 208(h) provides that a guiding principle of the 
youth justice provisions is that the vulnerability of young persons entitles them 
to special protection during investigations into the commission or possible 
commission of any offence by them. 
The principle that children and young persons require special protection is 
clearly supported by the international instruments. It is set out in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICESCR and the ICCPR
83 and 
is the fundamental concept underlying the various international instruments 
that are specifically applicable to young persons. 
It will be seen from the above that the philosophy, object and principles of the youth 
justice provisions of the CYPF Act mostly conform to international guidelines for 
dealing with young people within the criminal process. The major exception to this 
is in relation to the right of young persons to express their views when decisions are 
being made about them and I have suggested, above, that section 5( d) of the CYPF 
Act does not meet international standards in this regard. Further, there is evidence 
that practices under the youth justice system introduced by the CYPF Act are 
leaving the majority of young persons feeling that their views have not been heard. 
IV SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE CYPF ACT 
1. Application of the Act 
Before I go on to examine particular provisions of the CYPF Act to determine the 
extent to which they comply with international instruments, one important area 
where the Act does not meet international standards must be mentioned. The 
83 See page 4 above. 
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CYPF Act applies to children and young persons. A child is defined as any person 
beneath the age of 14 years; and a young person is defined as any person over the 
age of 14 years but under 17 years, but excluding any person who is or has been 
married.84 
In relation to the right to special protection under the ICCPR, the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee have issued the following General Comment:85 
The right to special measures of protection belongs to every child because of his status as a 
minor. Nevertheless, the Covenant does not indicate the age at which he attains his majority. 
This is to be determined by each State party in the light of the relevant social and cultural 
conditions. . .. However, the Committee notes that the age for the above purposes should not 
be set unreasonably low and that in any case a State party cannot absolve itself from its 
obligations under the Covenant regarding persons under the age of 18, notwithstanding that they 
have reached the age of majority under domestic law. 
Pursuant to this comment, there is a strong argument that the protection extended 
under the CYPF Act ought to be applied to all persons under the age of eighteen. 
In this regard it is also notable that the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
defines a "child" as "every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, 
under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier."86 Further, 
although the Beijing Rules define a "juvenile" as "any child or young person who, 
under the respective legal systems, may be dealt with for an offence in a manner 
which is different from an adult, "87 Rule 3.3 provides that "[ e ]fforts shall also be 
made to extend the principles embodied in the Rules to young adult offenders." 
The JDL Rules expressly apply to all persons under the age of 18.88 
84 Section 2 . 
8.5 General Comment 17 [35], adopted on 5 April 1989. Ref CCPR/C/21/Rev.1, p 22. 
86 Above nl7, Article 1. 
87 Above n22, Rule 2.2(a). 
88 Above n25, Rule ll(a). 
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2. Diversion 
The international standards that relate to youth justice strongly encourage diversion 
of young offenders from the formal criminal process. The CYPF Act includes 
provisions which promote diversion, and an analysis of statistics before and after the 
CYPF Act came into force indicates that the specific provisions of the Act are 
proving effective in practice. 
Under the 1974 Act, diversion was encouraged by the provision of "Youth Aid 
Consultations" .89 However research carried out in 198790 concluded that the 
diversionary mechanisms set out in that Act did not work. Two main reasons were 
advanced for this. Firstly, the general failure of police to adopt this method of 
dealing with young offenders and, secondly, police domination of the Youth Aid 
conferences that did take place. The report found that when Police believed a 
young person should be prosecuted they would arrest him or her, to avoid the 
necessity for a Youth Aid consultation.91 This finding was recently borne out in 
comments made by the retiring police Chief Superintendent of Manukau District 
Police, Jim Morgan, who told of his experience of police arresting young persons 
under the old legislation so that their cases would not go through the youth aid 
section, which they perceived as the "soft path".92 
The CYPF Act provides that police93 officers must consider giving a warning rather 
than prosecuting a young person (unless a warning is clearly inappropriate )94 • 
Section 245 provides that a young person must not be prosecuted for an offence 
( other than murder, manslaughter or a traffic offence not punishable by 
89 See page 21 above. 
90 Above, n73. 
91 Above, n73, 34 . 
92 Above n8, Section 1, 9. 
93 I use the word "police" throughout this paper for the sake of clarity. In the statute 
the term used is "enforcement officer", which covers police, traffic officers and public 
service and local authority officials (section 2(1)) . 
94Section 209. 
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imprisonment) unless the police officer concerned believes prosecution is required 
in the public interest; and there has been consultation between the informant ( or a 
person acting on his or her behalf), and a youth justice coordinator; and, usually,95 
the matter has been considered by a family group conference. Where a young 
person has been arrested (for an offence other than murder, manslaughter or a 
traffic offence not punishable by imprisonment), unless the young person denies the 
charge,96 a family group conference must be held before the Court decides the 
outcome of the case.97 
These provisions make consideration of diverting a young offender mandatory when 
a police officer is contemplating instituting criminal proceedings. They also mean 
criminal proceedings cannot be commenced without a family group conference 
having been held ( except where the young person has been arrested, and in that 
case, unless the young person denies the charge, no plea can be entered without a 
family group conference having discussed the case). 
Thus the prov1s10ns in the CYPF Act create a strong presumption in favour of 
diversion, and the evidence available so far indicates that this is resulting in a 
dramatic change in the way young offenders are being dealt with. 
A 1990 study98 found that the majority of identified offenders who were not 
arrested (66%), were being diverted by way of police warnings and formal cautions. 
95 Section 248 provides certain specific exceptions to the requirement that a family group 
conference be held before a young person may be prosecuted. Further exceptions are 
likely to be added following the Report of the Ministerial Review Team on the CYPF 
Act (seep 40 of the Report and pp 12-13 of the Government's Response). 
96 If the young person denies the charge, sections 273 to 276 apply, which provide for 
appropriate courts to hear and determine cases. Note, however, if the charge is 
proved and a family group conference has not already been held, a youth justice 
coordinator must convene a family group conference to consider ways the court may 
deal with the offence forming the basis of the charge (unless the situation falls within 
one of the exceptions in section 248) (section 247(3)) . 
97 Section 246. 
98 GM Maxwell and A Morris A, "Juvenile Crime and the Children Young Persons and 
their Families Act 1989", An Appraisal of the first Year of the Children Young Persons 
and their Families Act 1989, A Briefing Paper (Office of the Commissioner for 
Children, Wellington, 1991) 24, 27 . 
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A further 13% were diverted with police warnings and the imposition of sanctions 
( eg apology, reparation or community work). The remaining 21 % were cases where 
the Police thought prosecution should be considered, and were referred to a Youth 
Justice Coordinator so that a family group conference to discuss the matter could 
be held. A large majority of these cases (80%) did not result in a court appearance 
following the Family Group Conference. The end result is that only approximately 
4% of identified offenders (who were not arrested) appeared in the Youth Court 
and were dealt with by way of a court order.99 
Of identified offenders who were arrested (who encompassed only 6% of the total 
of identified offenders - see page 26 below), the majority would also not have been 
dealt with by way of a court order. A family group conference must be convened 
before the Court decides the outcome of a case (unless the young person denies the 
charge laid) and the recommendations of conferences are frequently accepted. This 
often leads to the prosecution withdrawing the charge.100 These figures clearly 
show that since the CYPF Act came into force only a tiny proportion of the total of 
young persons identified by police as having offended are dealt with by way of a 
court conviction and sentence; the vast majority being diverted either by police 
action or as a result of family group conference recommendations. 
This can be contrasted with figures from 1984 which indicated 55% of offenders 
were diverted - the remainder being dealt with in the Children and Young Persons 
Court.101 
A study of juvenile offending in 1990 stated: 102 
99 Above n98, 27. 
100 Above, n98, 28. 
101 G Maxwell and A Morris A Statistical Overview of Juvenile Offending Before and Since 
the Children, Young Persons and their Families Act 1989 (Institute of Criminology, 
Victoria University of Wellington, 1990). 
102 Above nlOl, 21. 
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The main conclusion to emerge ... is that offending patterns have changed very little, if at all, 
since the introduction of the 1989 Act, but that responses to juvenile offending have changed 
markedly. 
The study concluded: 
The results reported here are very encouraging. They suggest the Act is achieving its goal of 
diverting many young offenders from the Youth Court. 103 
This result is totally in accord with the international instruments that deal with youth 
justice. For example, Article 40(3) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
provides: 
(3) States Parties shall seek to promote the establishment of laws, procedures, authorities and 
institutions specifically applicable to children alleged as, accused of, or recognized as having 
infringed the penal law, and, in particular: ... 
(b) Whenever appropriate and desirable, measures for dealing with such children without 
resorting to judicial proceedings, providing that human rights and legal safeguards are 
fully respected . 
Rule 11 of the Beijing Rules, which provides: 
11.1 Consideration shall be given, wherever appropriate, to dealing with juvenile offenders 
without resorting to formal trial by the competent authority ... 
11.2 The police, the prosecution or other agencies dealing with juvenile cases shall be 
empowered to dispose of such cases, at their discretion, without recourse to formal 
hearings, in accordance with the criteria laid down for that purpose in the respective 
legal system and also in accordance with the principles contained in these Rules. 
Article 58 of the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile 
Delinquency provides: 
Law enforcement and other relevant personnel, of both sexes, should be trained to respond to 
the special needs of young persons and should be familiar with and use, to the maximum extent 
possible, programmes and referral possibilities for the diversion of young persons from the 
justice system. 
103 Above 11101, 28. 
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3. Arrest 
International human rights instruments clearly provide that the arrest of young 
persons is only permissible as a measure of last resort. The CYPF Act lays down 
stringent criteria which must be met before a young person may be arrested and 
statistics show that this is resulting in a considerable reduction in the numbers of 
young persons being arrested compared with previous legislation. 
Section 214 provides that (other than where a young person is suspected of 
committing a purely indictable offence, or where a police officer believes, on 
reasonable grounds, that arrest is necessary in the public interest), a young person 
may not be arrested except on specified grounds. In summary, the police officer 
must be satisfied, on reasonable grounds: 
(a) that arrest is necessary to: 
(i) ensure the young person's appearance before court; or 
(ii) prevent the young person committing further offences; or 
(iii) prevent the destruction of evidence of interference with witnesses, 
and 
(b) that a summons would not achieve that purpose. 
A written report stating why the young person was arrested must be furnished to 
specified senior officers ( depending on the authority under which the enforcement 
officer acted) within 3 days. 
There is evidence to show that this statutory limitation of circumstances in which a 
young person may be arrested has resulted in a substantial decrease in arrests of 
young persons. Recalling police practices of Auckland in the 1970's, retired police 
Chief Superintendent, Jim Morgan, was recently quoted as saying: "Young people 
were arrested without any regard for their age. I remember visiting the cells and 
finding young people in cells who could barely look over the middle bar ... ".104 
104 Above n8. 
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Statistics have shown that in 1984 29% of juvenile offenders identified by police 
were arrested. However a study of police statistics undertaken in 1990 revealed that 
only 6% of identified offenders were being arrested since the Act came into 
force. 105 
This decrease in arrests of young persons is in keeping with international guidelines. 
Article 9(1) of the ICCPR provides: 
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shaU be subjected to arbitrary 
arrest or detention. 
Article 37(b) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides: 
States Parties shall ensure that: ... 
(b) No child shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily. The arrest, 
detention or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with the law and shall be 
used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time; [ my 
emphasis] 
4. Rights of young persons when being questioned by police 
Section 215 of the CYPF Act is perhaps the section that has caused the most 
controversy since the Act came into force. This section sets out the explanations 
which must be given by an enforcement officer when "questioning" a young person 
in relation to the possible commission of an offence "by that young person". 
In summary, it provides that where a young person has not been arrested, but 
sufficient grounds for arrest exist, the police officer must explain to the young person 
(in a manner and language appropriate to the understanding of the young 
person)106: 
105 Above n98, 27. 
106 Section 218. 
40 
(a) that the young person may be arrested if he or she refuses to give his or her 
I name and address; 
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(b) that the young person is not obliged to accompany the police officer to any 
place to be questioned, and if he or she consents to do so, that consent may 
be withdrawn at any time; 
(c) that he or she is under no obligation to make any statement; 
( d) that if he or she does consent to make a statement, that consent may be 
withdrawn at any time; 
( e) that any statement made may be used in evidence; and 
(f) that he or she is entitled to consult with, and to make any statement in the 
presence of, a solicitor107 and any adult the young person nominates ( eg a 
parent or another member of the family or whanau, or any other adult)108 . 
Where a young person is arrested, only the last 4 explanations must be given . 
The Act provides that (unless the explanations have been given within the last 
hour)109, the explanations outlined above must again be given when a police 
officer makes up his or her mind to charge the young person and the last 4 
explanations outlined above must again be given when arresting a young person. 110 
When section 215 is analysed closely, it is apparent that the only rights a young 
person has which exceed an adult's rights when being questioned are: 
107 See also sections 227 and 228 - entitlement to consult privately with a solicitor when 
being questioned at an enforcement agency; when arrested; and when being questioned 
in hospital. 
108 See section 222. Note, however, the enforcement officer may refuse permission to 
consult with any nominated person in certain circumstances. 
JO') Section 219. 
110 Sections 217 and 218 respectively. 
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(1) the right to be informed of his or her rights when questioning in relation to the 
possible commission of an offence by that young person commences ( an adult 
must be informed of his or her rights only once it has been decided to charge 
him or her, or on arrest)111; and 
(2) the right to have an independent adult present during questioning, in addition 
to a solicitor. 
With the exception of the right to have an independent adult and a lawyer present 
during questioning, 112 the rights a young person must be informed of pursuant to 
section 215 are basic rights that every person in New Zealand has who is under 
investigation. All the other rights exist independently of the CYPF Act, and apply 
equally to adults. They may be summarised as: 
(a) the right to liberty and not to be arbitrarily detained, which is provided in 
Articles 3 and 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 
9(1) of the ICCPR, and recognised in section 22 of the Bill of Rights; 
(b) the right to remain silent, which is provided in Article 3(g) of the ICCPR and 
recognised in the Judges Rules 1912 and in sections 23( 4) and 25( d) of the Bill 
of Rights; and 
(c) the right to consult a lawyer, which is provided in Article 14(3)(b) of the 
ICCPR and recognised in section 24(c) of the Bill of Rights . 
The New Zealand Police Association made submissions to the committee reviewing 
the CYPF Act criticising section 215 and arguing that the section should be 
repealed.113 They submitted that the provision for informing a young person of 
his or her rights once it has been decided to lay a charge is sufficient. They argued 
111 See Judges Rules 1912, No 2; Bill of Rights Act 1990, ss 23 and 24. 
112 See pages 47-51 below for discussion of this right. 
113 New Zealand Police Association (Inc), Submission on the Review of the Children, 
Young Persons and their Families Act 1989, October 1991, p 8. 
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that section 215 reduces police effectiveness when they are investigating offences, 
meaning they are unable to gather even general information about offences 
involving children or young persons. 
However, section 215 does not prohibit general inquiries being made of young 
persons in relation to an offence, unless the inquiries relate to the possible 
commission of an offence by that young person. Where this is the case, it is 
submitted there is good reason to inform the young person of his or her rights at the 
commencement of questioning. Doing so will ensure that the young person is not 
denied the protection available to all persons during investigations purely by reason 
of his or her immaturity. It is reasonable to assume that a young person is less 
likely to be aware of his or her rights than an adult, and that even where a young 
person is aware of his or her rights, he or she may lack sufficient confidence to 
exercise those rights. What section 215 does, then, is to ensure that young persons 
are made aware that they have rights, and that they are entitled to exercise them 
when they are under investigation . 
A system allowing interviews to proceed without a young person being informed of 
his or her rights until the investigating officer has decided to charge the young 
person is open to abuse. This is well illustrated by the cross examination of an 
officer which is set out in R v Butcher,114 in which the officer admits deliberately 
delaying formally charging a suspect in order to obtain a confession from him before 
he was obliged to inform him of his right to a lawyer under the Bill of Rights . 
Another criticism that has been levelled at section 215 is that it leaves police 
powerless to deal with a hard core of "streetwise" young offenders, who are well 
aware of their rights.115 Under the Act the police have the power to arrest a 
young person if they believe it is necessary in the public interest or that proceeding 
by way of summons will not ensure a Court appearance; and they may also question 
or warn young persons, providing they inform them of their rights first. If these 
114 (1992] 2 NZLR 257. 
115 See The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 25 January 1992, 1 - ·Hard Core of 
Lawless Youth Stymies Police" and The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 18 
February 1992, 7 - •Act Makes it Tough for Police to Nab Young Thugs". 
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young people are already aware of their rights, it is hard to see why informing them 
is a problem.116 
Repealing section 215 will not make it any easier for the police to deal with the 
hard core, streetwise young offenders, who are already aware of their rights. The 
only young persons who will be affected are those who are unaware of their rights, 
or lack confidence to exercise them, and these are the ones who most need the 
protection afforded by section 215 to enable them to exercise the basic rights which 
any person in New Zealand has when under investigation. 
The right of young persons to extra protection because of their vulnerability is well 
grounded in international human rights instruments. I have highlighted these 
provisions in Part I of this paper, but they bear repeating. In particular, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that childhood is entitled to 
"special care and assistance";117 the ICESCR provides that "special measures of 
protection and assistance should be taken on behalf of all children and young 
persons";118 and the ICCPR provides that "[ e ]very child shall have ... the right to 
such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of 
his family, society and the State."119 In the context of investigating an alleged 
offence by a juvenile, Rule 10.3 of the Beijing Rules provides: 
Contacts between the law enforcement agencies and a juvenile offender shall be managed in such 
a way as to respect the legal status of the juvenile, promote the well-being of the juvenile and 
avoid harm to her or him, with due regard to the circumstances of the case. 
The official commentary to Rule 10.3 states: 
Rule 10.3 deals with some fundamental aspects of the procedures and behaviour on the part of 
the police and other law enforcement officials in cases of juvenile crime. To "avoid harm" 
admittedly is flexible wording and covers many features of possible interaction (for example the 
116 See comments in "Children", the magazine of the Office of the Commissioner for 
Children, March 1992, No 4, p 4. 
117 
118 
119 
Above nll, Article 25(2). 
Above n12, Article 10(3). 
Above n12, Article 24. 
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use of harsh language, physical violence or exposure to the environment). Involvement in 
juvenile justice processes in itself can be "harmful" to juveniles: the term "avoid harm" should 
be broadly interpreted, therefore, as doing the least harm possible to the juvenile in the first 
instance, as well as any additional or undue harm. This is especially important in the initial 
contact with law enforcement agencies, which might profoundly influence the juvenile's attitude 
towards the State and society .... 
The obligation on police officers to avoid harm to the juvenile on initial contact 
would clearly encompass informing a young person suspected of having committed 
an offence of his or her rights at the commencement of the investigation. Repeal 
of section 215 would deny young persons the special protection to which they are 
entitled under international human rights instruments . 
The Ministerial Review Team on the CYPF Act who, amongst other things, were 
charged with the task of considering and making recommendations on proposals for 
amendment to the Act by police, supported the retention of section 215. In their 
report120 ("the Mason Report") the team propose dealing with the police criticism 
that they feel hampered from making even general inquiries of young people be 
dealt with by an amendment to the section to allow "general inquiries" to take 
place before a young person must be informed of his or her rights. A working party 
is to be set up to define exactly what is meant by "general inquiries". This would, 
m any event, appear to have been the original intention of the drafters of the 
Act.121 Provided the definitiol) of "general inquiries" is carefully drafted, there 
can be no objection to this amendment. The definition must be worded to ensure 
that once the investigation into an offence has proceeded to the point where a 
particular young person is suspected, section 215 will operate to place an obligation 
on an investigating officer to inform that young person of his or her rights while 
evidence is still being collected, and prior to a decision being made to charge him 
or her. This is the most critical time when a young person can exercise his or her 
basic rights. 
120 Report of the Ministerial Review Team to the Minister of Social Welfare Review of 
the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989 (Wellington, 1992), 158. 
121 Above n120, 153. 
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Recent investigations into the functioning of the CYPF Act in practice have revealed 
that the procedures laid down in section 215 are frequently not being followed by 
police when questioning young persons in situations where a formal statement is not 
being sought. The study revealed that some police may make a distinction between 
questioning young persons, and taking formal statements from them, and will only 
inform young persons of their rights prior to taking a statement which they wish to 
use in court.122 This is clearly not the intention of section 215, which requires a 
young person's rights to be explained to him or her prior to any questioning . 
Furthermore, it is submitted that the practice of only informing a young person of 
his or her rights prior to taking a formal statement does not accord with 
international instruments which set out the special protection that must be provided 
to young persons. 
5. Adult Support 
A number of provisions in the CYPF Act enable a child or young person who is to 
be interviewed to receive the support of an adult. These sections give practical 
effect to the principle that the vulnerability of young persons entitles them to special 
protection. 
Right to have a parent or guardian informed of arrest and to consult an independent 
adult and/or a solicitor 
Section 229 provides that where a young person is at an enforcement agency office 
for questioning or following arrest, the police officer must, as soon as practicable 
after the young person arrives at the police station, inform a person nominated by 
the young person 123, and (unless it is "impracticable" to do so) a parent or 
guardian of the young person (if the young person has not already nominated such 
122 Above n182, 72. [NB: As at 1 September 1992 publication of this paper is pending, 
and the citing of it has only been permitted on the basis that any findings will not 
appear in any publication without the prior consent of the authors.] 
123 The person must be nominated in accordance with section 231, and may be any adult 
the young person chooses, but the enforcement officer has a right of refusal where he 
or she believes, on reasonable grounds, that the person nominated would be likely to 
attempt to prevent the course of justice if allowed to visit the young person . 
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person). Those people are entitled to visit and consult privately with,124 the young 
person at the police station, and must be informed, as soon as practicable after 
arriving at the police station of the young person's rights. 
In addition, under section 227, a young person in these situations must be informed 
that he or she is entitled to consult a lawyer. 
The obligation on police to inform parents of the arrest or detention of their child 
is well-grounded in international instruments. The provision in section 229 that 
parents may not be informed of their child's detention if it is "impractical"' to so 
inform them, however, does not accord with international requirements. To accord 
with the international instruments, the parents of a young person who has been 
arrested or detained must be informed immediately. 
The Body of Principles for the Protection of all Persons under any Form of 
Detention or Imprisonment provide for detained persons and their counsel to be 
informed of the charges against them,125 and Principle 16 provides: 
(1) Promptly after arrest and after each transfer from one place of detention or 
imprisonment to another, a detained or imprisoned person shall be entitled to notify or 
to require the competent authority to notify members of his family or other appropriate 
persons of his choice of his arrest, detention or imprisonment or of the transfer and of 
the place where he is kept in custody .... 
(3) If a detained or imprisoned person is a juvenile or is incapable of understanding his 
entitlement, the competent authority shall on its own initiative undertake the notification 
referred to in the present principle. Special attention shall be given to notifying parents 
or guardians.126 [my emphasis] 
Rule 92 of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners provides 
that: 
124 Note, however, section 229(3) . 
125 Above n21, Principles 10, 11 and 17. 
126 See also Article 40 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and Article 7.1 of 
the Beijing Rules. 
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An untried prisoner shall be allowed to inform immediately his family of his detention and shall 
be given all reasonable facilities for communication with his family and friends, and for receiving 
visits from them ... [my emphasis] 
Rule 10.1 of the Beijing Rules provides: 
Upon the apprehension of a juvenile, her or his parents or guardian shall be immediately 
notified of such apprehension and, where such immediate notification is not possible, the parents 
or guardian shall be notified within the shortest possible time thereafter. [my emphasis] 
Right to have an independent adult present during interviews 
While the CYPF Act falls short of prohibiting police interviews with young persons 
without an adult being present, it does provide that only statements made in the 
presence of either a solicitor or an independent adult will be admissible evidence 
in court. The common law recognises the general principle that if evidence is to be 
fairly obtained at an interview with a young person an adult should be present, as 
recommended in the police General Instructions.127 
Nevertheless, pnor to the CYPF Act evidence was admissible at the Court's 
discretion where a young person was interviewed alone ( the issue being whether the 
statement was obtained "fairly"), and it has been suggested that the 
recommendation in the Police General Instructions was "routinely ignored".128 
The original draft of the Children and Young Persons Bill provided that a statement 
made without an adult being present would be admissible evidence in proceedings, 
if the young person being interviewed had waived this right. There were a large 
number of submissions made to the working party on the Bill that this was an 
insufficient safeguard, and that the provision should be clear that statements will be 
127 See Part II above. 
128 R Ludbrook, Youth Law Project, submission to the Working Party on the Children 
and Young Persons Bill, submission number SS/89/270, p 3. 
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inadmissible if not made in the presence of an independent adult.129 The 1987 
Working Party Report130 summarised these submissions, saying: 
[Children's rights groups] believe that the provisions on admissibility of statements fail to give 
due recognition to the vulnerability of young people to the pressure inherent in arrest. There 
is concern that they may, as a result, inappropriately waive their basic rights. They believe there 
should be a provision that the Court shall not admit as evidence any statement made by a child 
or young person unless it has been made in the presence of a parent, guardian, person for the 
time being having responsibility for the welfare of the child or young person, or other trusted 
adult nominated by the child or young person. 
This position is supported by an article in the New Zealand Law Journal, 19 August 1980, by the 
Public Issues Committee of the Auckland District Law Society, reviewing the case of two 15 year 
old youths who were induced by Police questioning to make false admissions of guilt to a murder 
and who were subsequently charged. 
The Working Party concluded that despite police views to the contrary, the clause 
should be strengthened to remove the provision for a young person to waive the 
right to an adult's presence during interviews. They stated that the earlier draft 
which provided for the possibility of a waiver, ignored uthe vulnerability of the child 
or young person to persuasion."131 Accordingly, section 221 now provides that a 
young person's statement will not be admissible in Court unless it was made in the 
presence of an independent adult. 
In submissions to the Ministerial Review Team on the CYPF Act,132 the Police 
Association sought amendment to section 221 to allow evidence of an interview to 
be admitted if it was taken by means of videotaping, where a suitable adult could 
not be contacted within a reasonable time (they suggested 2 hours). They cited 
129 See, for instance, the submissions of: the Human Rights Commission, SS/89/157 pp 
11-13; the Methodist Connexional Youth Task Group SS/89/159, p 3; the Youth Law 
Project, SS/89/270, pp 3-4; the Common Law Committee of the Auckland District 
Law Society, SS/89/84, p 3; the Labour Youth Council, New Zealand Labour Party, 
SS/89/72, p 8; W Young (Director Institute of Criminology, Victoria University of 
Wellington) and N Cameron (Senior Lecturer in Law, Victoria University of 
Wellington), SS/89 /108, pp 43-44; the New Zealand Council for Civil Liberties, 
SS/89/20, p 2; and the National Youth Council of New Zealand, SS/89/126, p 2. 
130 Working Party on the Children and Young Persons Bill, Review of the Children and 
Young Persons Bill (Wellington, 1987,) 60. 
131 Above nl30, 62. 
132 Above, n113. 
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examples where considerable time was spent locating suitable adults so that an 
interview could proceed. The Ministerial Review Team have indicated support for 
this request in principle.133 The Mason Report recommends that consultations 
take place between the Department of Social Welfare, the police, the Justice 
Department and the New Zealand Law Society to consider the feasibility of this 
suggestion. 
While videotaping an interview would provide protection for a young person from 
blatantly unfair questioning, it hardly provides guidance and support for the young 
person m exercising his or her rights, such as the right to remain silent. It is 
submitted that a videotape is no substitute for the physical presence of an 
independent adult - preferably one selected by the young person. 
In R v W 34 Robertson J spoke of the function of an independent adult being 
present at an interview with a young person pursuant to the requirements of the 
police General Instructions, in the following terms: 
I do not accept that the individual person was there to simply monitor procedure. She was there 
so that [the young person] would not be disadvantaged. Although she was clearly an experience 
and caring person there were still disadvantages. First, she was not known to [the young person] 
and there was little established rapport between them. Secondly, she did not comprehend that 
she had a pro-active role in ensuring that [the young person] was able to enjoy whatever 
advantages the general law provided for him. 
After referring to the campaign to have police interviews videotaped, and stating 
that in the case before him there was no dispute as to the accuracy of the police 
officers recollection of what was said, Robertson J continued: 
The question here is the circumstances in which it was said and the procedures which ought to 
have attended the obtaining of the evidence. These are fundamental issues not addressed by the 
sophistication of recording techniques. 
133 Above n120, 186. 
134 Above n49, 3. 
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In R v Tuhua135 the Court of Appeal concluded, in relation to a statement made 
to the police by a young person without the presence of a supportive adult, that 
"[t]he dynamics of the interview would have been quote different had a second adult 
been present. Here the police were in a position of dominance and the oral 
evidence was obtained by their use of that dominant position." 
The right to have a supportive adult present during questioning is supported at 
international law. In particular, Rule 7.1 of the Beijing Rules provides: 
Basic procedural safeguards such as the presumption of innocence, the right to be notified of 
the charges, the right to remain silent, the right to counsel, the right to the presence of a parent 
or guardian, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses and the right to appeal to a higher 
authority shall be guaranteed at all stages of proceedings. [My emphasis] 136 
Section 222 already enables police to interview young persons where a particular 
adult selected by the young person is inappropriate or unable to be located within 
a reasonable time, without the need to resort to videotaping the interview. Section 
222 allows the Police to refuse to allow consultation with an adult nominated by a 
young person if it is believed, on reasonable grounds, that that person nominated: 
(a) would be likely to attempt to pervert the course of justice; or 
(b) cannot with reasonable diligence be located, or will not be available within a 
period of time that is reasonable in the circumstances . 
If there is a refusal on these grounds, the young person may nominate another adult. 
Where the young person refuses to nominate a suitable adult, the police may 
themselves nominate any adult who is not an enforcement officer.137 Thus, if a 
135 Above n47. 
136 Note also, Article 3(2) and Article 5 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and 
Rule 10.1 of the Beijing Rules; and principles 16, 17, 18 and 19 of the Body of 
Principles for the Protection of All Persons under any form of Detention or 
Imprisonment. 
137 Section 222(l)(d). 
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suitable adult will not be available within a "reasonable" time, the Police may 
themselves nominate an adult to be present at the interview. It must be possible to 
organise a roster of adults willing to be contacted for this purpose from amongst, 
say, Citizens Advice Bureaux staff, Youth Advocates, Community Law Centre 
personnel, Social Welfare personnel, etc. It is relevant that a recent study of the 
functioning of the CYPF Act has found that in 81 % of cases the parents of young 
persons detained by police were able to be contacted either straight away or within 
an hour.138 
The right to have an independent adult present during interviews is an important, 
basic right for a young person, supported by international guidelines as to the 
treatment of young persons. This right should not be allowed to be eroded by the 
substitute of a requirement to videotape interviews where a suitable adult cannot be 
located. The current provisions allow the police to nominate an adult if it is not 
possible to locate an adult nominated by the young person who is able to be present 
within a reasonable time. This provision is sufficient to allow interviews to proceed 
without denying the young person the support of an independent adult. 
6. Exclusion of evidence 
Section 221 provides that no statement made to an enforcement officer by a young 
person is admissible in evidence in proceedings against the young person unless: 
(1) prior to making the statement the young person's rights were explained; and 
(2) where the young person expressed a wish to consult with a solicitor and/or 
another adult nominated by the young person, he or she did so before making 
the statement; and 
(3) the statement was made in the presence of a barrister or solicitor, and/or an 
independent adult. 
138 Above n82, 72-73. 
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However, statements will not be inadmissible where any requirement of section 221 
was not complied with, provided there was "reasonable compliance";139 or where 
the statement was made spontaneously before the enforcement officer had a 
"reasonable opportunity" to comply with the requirements of that section.140 
This section prima facie gives a young person a more certain remedy than an adult 
would have if his or her rights were breached. An adult derives rights from the 
Judges' Rules and the Bill of Rights. A breach of the Judges' Rules will mean the 
court has a discretion whether to admit evidence obtained by that breach. However, 
it has been held that a breach of the standard of conduct provided in the Judges' 
Rules will go a long way towards excluding any evidence obtained.141 In relation 
to a breach of rights under the Bill of Rights, Cooke P in the Court of Appeal in 
1991 stated the principle that "prima facie, ... a violation of the Bill of Rights should 
result in the ruling out of evidence obtained thereby."142 Accordingly, in practice 
the rules relating to admissibility of evidence obtained in breach of an adult's rights 
and a youth's rights may not be very different. 
The Courts so far have generally not shrunk from giving full force to the exclusion 
of evidence provision,143 which has, at times provoked a public outcry. Most 
notably in the case of Jason Irwin, where a 15 year old was discharged from a 
murder charge for lack of evidence, following his statement being ruled inadmissible 
under section 221. Fisher J stated: 
In the absence of reasonable compliance [with section 221) the Court has no discretion: it must 
reject the statement.144 
139 Section 224. 
140 Section 223. 
141 R v Convery [1986) NZLR 426, 442, per McCarthy J. 
142 Above n114. 
143 See R v Toko (1991) 7 FRNZ 447; R v Irwin (1991) 8 CRNZ 39, (1991) 8 FRNZ 
487; R v Fitzgerald Unreported, 30 October 1990, High Court Auckland Registry 
T183/90, Thorp J. 
144 R v Irwin, above n143. 
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He concluded that in the case before him there were numerous breaches of the Act 
which were "individually significant and cumulatively overwhelming." 
A case that has allowed evidence to be presented despite breaches of section 221 
is the Court of Appeal decision in R v Accused.145 In that case a 14 year old boy 
was interviewed in his mother's presence, but was not told he could nominate any 
adult to consult with and make his statement in the presence of. In addition, 
although he was informed that he had the right to consult a lawyer, he was not 
further told that he could have the lawyer present while he was interviewed. 
Despite these breaches, Robertson J in the High Court concluded there was 
"reasonable compliance" with section 221 on the basis that the boy did not ask to 
consult a lawyer when informed of his right to, and therefore would not have 
requested a lawyer's presence during the interview had he known of this right; and 
on the further basis that his mother was present throughout the interview and this 
sufficiently met the requirement for an adult's presence, even though the adult was 
not there pursuant to nomination by the young person. Robertson J stressed that 
his decision was predicated on the basis that there was no intentional deviation from 
the provisions and no endeavour to take advantage of the boy. He said: 
I am prepared to apply s 224 to a situation where I am able to say with confidence that what 
Parliament determined young folk must have so that they are not taken advantage of, was in fact 
and in realilty [sic] provided to this lad. 146 
The Court of Appeal upheld the decision that this was a case of reasonable 
compliance, but noted that this case was "not far from the borderline."147 
Cooke P, delivering the judgment of the Court, stated: 
We are far from suggesting that these sections impose mere formalities and may be disregarded 
with impunity by investigating police officers. That is certainly not the case. Had we entertained 
any concern about adequate protection for this particular young person, the Court would not 
have hesitated to reverse the learned Judge's decision. 
145 (1991) 8 FRNZ 119. 
146 R v F Unreported, 12 September 1991, High Court DUnedin Registry T9/91, 
Robertson J, 12. 
147 Above n145, 122. 
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The rules relating to exclusion of evidence are designed to ensure compliance with 
provisions in the CYPF Act which protect young persons. The principle of 
"effective protection of rights" requires interpretation of legislation designed to 
protect human rights in a way that secures effective enjoyment of those rights in any 
given situation.148 The Courts must continue to be vigilant in excluding evidence 
obtained from young persons where section 221 has not been fully complied with. 
Wherever there is any suggestion that the failure to comply with section 221 has 
resulted in a denial of a young person's internationally recognised right to special 
protection, any evidence so obtained must be excluded. 
It will be seen from this paper that the rights of young persons which must be 
complied with before evidence will be admissible are fully defensible at international 
law, and are largely identical to an adults" rights. The differences that do exist (the 
right of a young person to be informed of his or her rights when investigation 
commences; the right to have an adult and a solicitor present at a interview; and the 
mandatory exclusion of evidence unfairly obtained), give force to the principle that 
a young person's vulnerability entitles him or her to extra protection. 
V CONCLUSION 
International human rights instruments stress the right of children and young persons 
to special protection. In the past, laws and practices in New Zealand have fallen 
short of the standards now required by international instruments. This can be 
explained by the fact that the major international instruments that specifically detail 
the protection young persons are entitled to in the criminal process have been 
drafted since 1985. However, it is imperative that our current laws and practices 
meet the standards set down in the international instruments. 
The CYPF Act has introduced a change in philosophy from the "welfare" model 
to the "justice" model of dealing with young offenders, which is a move to promote 
148 A Shaw and A Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights comes alive (I) [1991] NZU 
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accountability for offending. Along with this change, certain rights of young people 
under investigation have been given legislative force - largely these are rights which 
young persons have quite apart from the CYPF Act and are shared equally by 
adults. 
In this paper I have shown that the philosophy, object, principles and provisions of 
the CYPF Act, in the areas I have examined, represent a marked improvement on 
previous laws and practices. However, I have highlighted certain areas where New 
Zealand laws and practices could improve. In particular, the age at which young 
persons benefit from the special protection of the CYPF Act is lower than that 
suggested in the international instruments; and the right of young persons to 
participate in decisions which affect them is not being effectively guaranteed to 
them. I have also highlighted the fact that amendments to the CYPF Act are 
currently being considered which could erode rights provided under the CYPF Act. 
It is essential that any amendment to section 215 to allow "general inquiries" to be 
made of young persons without informing them of their rights is worded in a way 
that ensures any individual young person who is under investigation receives the 
protection of section 215. Further, no amendment should be made to the provision 
that young persons' statements are inadmissible unless they were made in the 
presence of an adult independent from the police. Videotaping interviews is no 
substitute for the presence of a supportive adult, and does not provide "special 
protection" to young persons as required in the international instruments. 
It is important not to lose sight of the fact that young persons are vulnerable. They 
should not be judged against the standards we expect adults to meet. The Riyadh 
Guidelines stress that: 
... youthful behaviour or conduct that does not conform to overall social norms and values is 
often part of the maturation and growth process and tends to disappear spontaneously in most 
individuals with the transition to adulthood. 149 
149 Above n31, Guideline 5(e). 
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Moira Rayner, the Commissioner for Equal Opportunities in Victoria, Australia, 
says:1so 
We are tolerant of small children's need to learn by their mistakes, and indulge •bad manners• 
in toddlers, but not in teenagers. We tolerate the anarchy and social failings of young children 
because we know they will, after all, grow out of it. We are not so accepting of the failings of 
older children who we treat as offenders against the criminal law but who also, statistically, 
•grow out of it•. (emphasis in original) 
Viewed against international instruments in the youth justice area the CYPF Act is 
not perfect; however, it does represent a significant advance towards meeting 
international standards, and is therefore undeserving of the criticism that continues 
to be levelled at it. 
150 M Rayner "Taking Seriously the Child's Right to be Heard" in P Alston and G 
Brennan (eds) The UN Children's Convention and Australia (ANU Centre for 
International and Public Law, Canberra, 1991) 6, 7. 
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